Insight : what is it, exactly? ; A commentary on Ursula Voss & Allan Hobson by Kühle, Lana
Insight: What Is It, Exactly?
A Commentary on Ursula Voss & Allan Hobson
Lana Kühle
In “What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dreaming? Recent advances and ques-
tions for future research”, Ursula Voss and Allan Hobson provide a detailed view
of the features characterizing lucid dreaming and put forward four innovative hy-
potheses to explain why and how lucid dreaming occurs, as well as how lucid
dream states are related to other states of consciousness. Their aim is to show
that not only is there benefit to studying lucid dreaming in itself, as this would
give us a deeper understanding of dream consciousness, but also that it is an im-
portant endeavor because of the kind of conscious state lucid dreaming is. To be
sure, Voss and Hobson make important in-roads into the empirical study of lucid
dreaming that ought to sprout new and exciting research in the area. As I will
show, however, there remains much conceptual work to be done. In this comment-
ary I tease out three aspects of Voss and Hobson’s view that would greatly benefit
from philosophical consideration. First,  I  highlight the lingering confusion with
what exactly insight is, and I point to how one might go about clarifying this no-
tion. Second, I argue that our understanding of insight and meta-awareness in lu-
cid dreaming could be greatly increased by looking at how these concepts are
used and understood in relation to meditative states. Last, I explore the role of the
body in lucid dreaming and argue that one’s bodily awareness in lucid dreams is
far more multi-faceted than at it might at first seem.
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1 Introduction
In “What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dream-
ing?—Recent advances and questions for future
research”, Ursula Voss & Allan Hobson (this col-
lection) aim to defend the veracity of, and value
in  empirically  studying  lucid  dreaming.  They
provide a detailed view of the features character-
izing  lucid  dreaming as  well  as  hypotheses  for
why  and  how lucid  dreaming  occurs.  As  they
claim, not only is there benefit to studying lucid
dreaming in itself, as this would give us a deeper
understanding of dream consciousness, it is also
an  important  endeavor  because  of  the  kind  of
conscious state lucid dreaming is. The authors ar-
gue that the study of  lucid dreaming will  also
deepen our understanding of the structure of con-
sciousness  more  broadly—the  nature  of  meta-
awareness, the notion of a self, and its relation to
our ability to be meta-aware, etc. 
To be sure, I think that Voss and Hobson
make important in-roads in defending the vera-
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city of lucid dreaming and putting forward hy-
potheses that ought to sprout new and exciting
research in the area, as I will elaborate in sec-
tion  2. However, I think there remains a need
for caution in how we describe and define lucid
dreaming, a great need for further clarification
of what lucidity involves, and potentially fruit-
ful  connections  to  be  drawn  between  lucid
dreaming states and meditative states. In what
follows, my goal is to elaborate on each of the
following three points with a view to generating
future discussion and discovery not only in the
area  of  lucid  dreaming  research,  but  also  in
areas  of  meditation  research  and  embodied
awareness research.
The first point on which I focus—in sec-
tion 3—is the concept of “insight”. To be sure,
Voss and Hobson do offer us a definition of in-
sight—an  awareness  of  being  in  a  dream,
knowing that what one is currently experien-
cing is not real, etc.1 However, their definition
conflates and confuses whether the insight in-
volved in lucid dreaming is a state or an abil-
ity, and whether it is an epistemic or phenom-
enal state/ability. In other words, does it in-
volve knowledge of something, is it simply ex-
periential,  or  is  it  an  ability  to  do  or  know
something, etc.? In this section, then, I delve
deeper  into  what  the  authors  mean  by  “in-
sight” and explore these questions, as well as
inquire whether insight is best understood us-
ing  epistemological  or  phenomenological
frameworks.  Moreover,  I  consider  what  the
consequences  of  an  underdeveloped  under-
standing of the concept of insight might be for
the current state of research on lucid dream-
ing.
The second point on which I focus—in sec-
tion 4—is the authors’ suggestion that we look
at other states of waking consciousness with a
view to determining how exactly insight comes
to co-occur with REM sleep. I consider the po-
tential similarities between lucid dreaming and
meditation, and suggest that there are fruitful
connections  to  be  drawn  between  the  meta-
awareness  associated  with  insight  in  lucid
1 See Voss and Hobson’s target article in this collection, and their de-
velopment of the LuCiD (Lucidity in Dreams) scale in  Voss et al.
(2013).
dreaming  and  the  meta-awareness  involved  in
certain meditative practices. 
The third point I consider—in section 5—
is the experience of the body in lucid dreaming.
In particular, I argue that if we accept one of
the authors’ hypotheses—the Hybrid State Hy-
pothesis—then we can enrich our understanding
of the bodily awareness involved in lucid dream-
ing  by  looking  at  certain  accounts  of  bodily
awareness  in  waking  consciousness.  More  spe-
cifically, I offer one interpretation for why the
dual experience of the dream body and the real
body in lucid dreaming is said to demand a lot
of  concentration  by  appealing  to  my  recent
work on bodily awareness in waking experiential
consciousness. Before I begin exploring each of
these three points,  however,  let  me first sum-
marize Voss and Hobson’s important contribu-
tions.
2 Voss & Hobson—A summary
In  their  piece,  Voss  and Hobson consider  the
latest empirical evidence on lucid dreaming and
set  forth  four  hypotheses  that,  they  suggest,
would begin to explain the whys and the hows
of  lucid  dreaming.  The  four  hypotheses  pro-
posed—the  BMH  (Brain  Maturation  Hypo-
thesis),  the GBH (Gamma Band Hypothesis),
the  HSH (Hybrid  State  Hypothesis),  and  the
SCH (Space of Consciousness Hypothesis)—are
based on five years of scientific research on lucid
dreaming and, together, are meant to provide a
multi-faceted picture of what lucid dreaming is,
how it arises, why it arises, and how it relates
to other states of consciousness. 
The first hypothesis they propose is the
BMH (Brain  Maturation  Hypothesis),  which
serves as a potential explanation for why there
is lucid dreaming. Evidence shows that lucid
dreaming  occurs  naturally  and  most  often
during  certain  periods  of  brain  development
and maturation in children and young adults.2
The empirical evidence also suggests that lu-
cid dreams are peculiar mental states that oc-
cur during the final stages on frontal lobe in-
tegration  and,  as  such,  are  “nothing  but  an
2 See Schredl & Erlacher (2011), as well as the Voss & Hobson target
article (this collection).
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accidental  confounding  of  conscious  states
during a time of high cerebral diversification”
(Voss &  Hobson this  collection,  p.  8).  For
these  reasons,  Voss &  Hobson hypothesize
that  “during  childhood  and  puberty,  frontal
lobe activity is sometimes decoupled from the
arousal state so that frontal lobes can become
active in a state for which this type of activity
is untypical”—the BMH (this collection, p. 8).
This, they propose, explains why lucid dream-
ing occurs. 
Voss  and  Hobson  then  offer  three  other
hypotheses—GBH, HSH, and SCH—as explana-
tions of  how lucid dreaming occurs. The GBH
(Gamma Band Hypothesis) provides an account
of  how lucid dreaming arises  by appealing to
specific  changes  in  brain  activity  associated
with the onset of a lucid dream during ongoing
REM sleep.  Specifically,  this  hypothesis  holds
that  the  principle  brain  correlate  of  lucid
dreaming is 40Hz activation of the frontal cor-
tex—activation at this frequency brings about
the  meta-awareness  associated  with  secondary
consciousness.  The  HSH (Hybrid  State  Hypo-
thesis) & SCH (Space of Consciousness Hypo-
thesis) shift away from particular brain activity
and, rather, provide a brain-based explanation
and  classification,  respectively,  of  what  lucid
dreaming is in relation to other mental states.
The HSH suggests that lucid dreaming involves
elements  of  both  waking  and  dreaming  con-
sciousness, and is, indeed, a destabilized hybrid
state involving both frontal cortex activation, as
suggested by the GBH, and REM sleep cortical
activation. The HSH explains the  how of lucid
dreaming by offering a way to reconcile the sub-
jective reports of lucid dreamers with the em-
pirical data of cortical activation. The SCH lays
out  a  three-dimensional  model  with  which  to
categorize various states of consciousness and to
see how the spectrum of mental states relate to
one another along certain variables. This model
allows  us  to  situate  lucid  dreaming  within  a
state space of consciousness and ascertain the
similarities  it  might  hold  with  other  waking
states of  consciousness.  These four hypotheses
work  together  to  consolidate  the  quantitative
and  qualitative  data  on  lucid  dreaming  and
provide a picture of why and how lucid dream-
ing  occurs.  For  my  purposes  here,  I  will  set
aside the BMH and the GBH and will instead
return to the HSH and the SCH in sections  4
and 5. 
Importantly,  the  authors  specify  that
their interest lies in considering REM-sleep lu-
cid  dreaming.  In  other  words,  the  focus  of
their  paper  is  to  consider  cases  where  the
dreamer  correctly  achieves  insight  into  the
fact  that  he  or  she  is  dreaming  while  the
dream continues (see Voss & Hobson this col-
lection, p. 4). The authors appeal to the Lu-
cidity and Consciousness in Dreams Scale (Lu-
CiD) they developed to assess the various fea-
tures  of  a  lucid  dream state,  and  with  this
they  describe  eight  features  of  lucid  dream
consciousness:  insight,  realism,  control,
memory,  thought,  positive  emotion,  negative
emotion,  and  dissociation.3 Of  these  eight
factors,  three  are  highlighted  as  particularly
important to the study of lucid dreaming—in-
sight,  control,  and  dissociation—as  they  do
not typically appear in non-lucid dreams.4 The
core criterion of lucid dreaming, however, ap-
pears to be insight. This feature, once it ap-
pears, then causally enables the possibility of
control  and  dissociation.  One  of  the  issues
that I will explore further in the next section
is whether insight should be thought of as an
epistemic  or  a  phenomenal  state,  and  what
either of these interpretations might mean for
understanding  the  role  of  insight  in  lucid
dreaming. 
Most  of  Voss  and  Hobson’s  article  dis-
cusses the features of insight and dissociation in
relation  to  recent  empirical  evidence,  and  al-
though there is indeed very illuminating discus-
sion of these features, I nonetheless think there
is still much conceptual confusion and semantic
vagueness with regard to what exactly they are
and how they relate to our non-dreaming con-
scious states. As I show in the next section, this
is  where  philosophical  considerations can help
clarify the conceptual landscape and help move
the empirical project forward. 
3 Voss and Hobson don’t discuss the possibility of there being varying
degrees of lucidity, and thus how these features might relate to such
varying degrees. For a discussion of this, see Noreika et al. (2010).
4 There are rare cases where some of these aspects do occur in non-lu-
cid dreaming states. See Voss et al. (2013) and Voss et al. (2014). 
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3 Understanding insight
The first element of Voss and Hobson’s piece on
which  I  want  to  focus  my  attention  is  the
concept on insight. More specifically, I want to
explore what the notions of lucidity and insight
involve and how they relate to dream conscious-
ness.  As  the  authors  clearly  state  throughout
their paper, lucidity involves insight, and insight
seems to be the key feature of lucid dreaming as
it serves the basis of dream lucidity and enables
the other elements of  dream lucidity to arise,
e.g., dissociation, control, etc. Without insight,
it appears, one could not have lucid dreaming.
Or, at the very least, it seems conceptually es-
sential to have insight in order to be in a state
of lucid dreaming.5 Given the importance of in-
sight, it is key that we obtain a clear view of
precisely what it is. 
In the first place, I think it is necessary to
distinguish  between  the  state of  insight  and
what one has insight about—let us refer to this
as the  content of insight. With regards to the
state of insight, it is not so clear what this pre-
cisely is, and the authors do not adequately cla-
rify it. For example, if it is an epistemic state,
then it would have an intentional object. The
questions then become: what are the intentional
objects  of  the state of  insight?  What kind of
knowledge does the state of insight involve? It is
in the second section of their paper, “Quantific-
ation of Dream Lucidity as Subjective Experi-
ence”,  that  Voss  and  Hobson  attempt  to  de-
scribe and define what the state of insight is.
There, they liken insight to a subjective aware-
ness of our mental state. This subjective aware-
ness, they go on to claim, is a form of secondary
awareness, or meta-awareness that arises in lu-
cid dreaming. They define meta-awareness, fol-
lowing Metzinger (2013), as “an instance of act-
ively  acquired  self-knowledge  or  a  sudden  in-
sight, regardless whether it is accurate or coun-
terfactual”  (Voss &  Hobson this  collection,  p.
4).  In  short,  insight  appears  to be a form of
awareness  that  arises  out  of  a  more  primary
5 We might not, however, be warranted to make a similar empirical
claim, i.e., that insight is empirically essential and sufficient for lucid
dreaming. Indeed, there is controversy over whether insight is empir-
ically sufficient for lucid dreaming. See Voss et al. (2013) and Windt
& Metzinger (2007) for further discussion of this issue.
awareness, and it allows the subject to attend
to, or “see” what is occurring in primary aware-
ness. 
Now,  a  number  of  questions  and  issues
arise from this definition of the state of insight.
First, it seems quite problematic to define in-
sight as a form of meta-awareness, and then to
define meta-awareness as an instance of sudden
insight.  Perhaps,  however,  we  might  want  to
rely on the first half of the disjunct in the defin-
ition quoted above and understand insight as a
form of actively-acquired self-knowledge. Given
that the authors refer to insight as a form of re-
flection  (Voss &  Hobson this  collection,  p.  6)
and as a form of knowing (ibid. p. 8) elsewhere
in the text, I will assume that this is the more
accurate reading of the definition. However, this
still raises questions. In what way are we to un-
derstand “actively acquire” in the case of lucid
dreaming? What does the dreamer do in a non-
lucid dream state to acquire insight and thus
bring about lucid dreaming? Is lucid dreaming
an ability?6 If so, then perhaps it is trainable.
Trainability might, in turn, provide us with an
answer to the first two questions: namely, what
might be involved in actively acquiring insight
and what exactly the dreamer does. If it is an
ability, perhaps the ability in question is one of
moving  into  a  state  of  meta-awareness.
Moreover, if the ability to shift into a state of
meta-awareness is an element of what the sub-
ject  “does”  to  actively  acquire  insight  while
dreaming, then looking to other mental states
that involve meta-awareness and that are also
“trainable” could be beneficial. 
One such set of mental states that involve
an aspect of trainability are meditative states.
Meditation is a practice, and with practice one
is able to achieve and sustain certain forms of
awareness—focused  attention,  open  awareness,
etc.7 If we take the element of practice in medit-
ation  as  being  akin  to a form of  trainability,
and the forms of awareness in meditation to be
6 For a review of the ways in which lucid dreaming is trainable see
Stumbrys et al. (2012).
7 Focused  attention  meditation  involves  developing  one’s  ability  to
concentrate  on an object for an unlimited amount of time. Open
presence/awareness meditation involves opening one’s awareness to
all experiential aspects of the moment,  e.g., mental states, bodily
sensations,  environmental  stimuli,  etc.,  and not attending to any-
thing in particular.
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akin  to  meta-awareness,  then  looking  at  the
practice of meditation—what one does, how one
improves, and so on—might be informative in
ascertaining whether actively acquiring insight
in  lucid  dreaming  is  something  that  is  train-
able.8 As I will detail in the next section, I be-
lieve  there  are  also  other  reasons  to  consider
meditation in relation to lucid dreaming. 
Another  line  of  questioning  that  arises
from Voss and Hobson’s definition of the state
of  insight  relates  to the concept  of  self-know-
ledge that, they claim, is an element of insight.
How are we to understand the concept of “self-
knowledge” as it applies to the insight gained in
lucid  dreaming?  What  is  the  “self”  involved?
And  how  strict  a  use  are  we  making  of  the
concept of knowledge—do we mean a justified
true belief?  The state of  insight  seems to in-
volve  very  different  characteristics.  Voss  and
Hobson hold that insight involves knowledge, or
the realization that one is dreaming, and they
also  describe  insight  as  an  experiential  phe-
nomenon, and one that involves reflection. The
issue  here  is  that  “knowledge”,  “realization”,
“experiential phenomenon”, and “reflection” are
not interchangeable concepts. It remains quite
unclear  from  the  descriptions  of  insight
provided whether we should view the state of
insight as an epistemic or phenomenal state of
consciousness.  Based  on  the  information  Voss
and Hobson provide in their piece, I am inclined
to move away from an epistemological view of
the state of  insight as I think the concept of
self-knowledge  is  too  complex  for  the  phe-
nomenon that Voss and Hobson describe. What
I mean here is simply that with the concept of
self-knowledge  come  notions  of  identification,
veridicality, the self,  and so on, and I do not
think that such a complex concept is necessary
to account for the experience of insight in lucid
dreaming. As Voss & Hobson explain, insight is
“[t]o some extent, the dreamer [having]”—“how-
ever  limited”—“access  to  secondary conscious-
ness,  enabling  her  to  reflect  on  her  present
state” (this collection, p. 8), and “[b]y second-
ary  consciousness  we  mean  the  subjective
8 The Tibetan Buddhist practice of dream yoga is a particularly interesting
area worthy of exploration in relation to this issue. See LaBerge (2003)
for a discussion of dream yoga in relation to lucid dreaming research.
awareness of our state in dreaming” (ibid.,  p.
4). Instead, I would suggest using the concept of
self-awareness to capture what is involved in in-
sight, and by self-awareness I mean here simply
the awareness of being in a certain experiential
moment.9 So, in the case of insight, one becomes
aware  of  dreaming—a  self-awareness—rather
than  acquiring  the  self-knowledge  that  one  is
dreaming. Perhaps, however, there is reason to
separate the concept of insight from that of lu-
cidity, and with this distinction we might want
to describe lucidity as a phenomenal state and
insight  as  an  epistemic  state.  I  think  there
might be good reason to take this route, and I
explore this in the next section by considering
the potential  relation between insight in lucid
dreaming and insight in meditative states. 
Now, these are issues that arise when con-
sidering what is meant by the “state” of insight.
As I distinguished earlier, however, there is also
the “content” of insight. With regards to the con-
tent of insight, in cases of lucid dreaming things
are  relatively  clear:  one  gains  insight  on  the
nature of one’s current dream state, i.e., that one
is currently dreaming. In other words, insight in-
volves  coming  to  realize  that one  is  dreaming.
This  way of  describing what occurs  in  insight,
however, could be seen as problematic in that it
takes insight to involve a particular kind of know-
ledge, namely, knowledge-THAT. If indeed insight
involves  knowledge-THAT,  then this  opens  the
door to theory-contamination; that is, the content
of insight is contaminated by what one already
believes  about  dreams,  consciousness,  etc.10 Al-
though I grant that this issue shows that there is
a need to clarify what exactly the content of in-
sight is, I am uncertain that it is as problematic
as it might at first seem to hold that insight in-
volves knowledge-THAT. How else would one be
able to “realize” that one was dreaming if one was
not able to identify, to some degree, that the state
one is in is a dream state? Moreover, it certainly
seems that to perform such an identification one
9 The “self” in self-awareness here does not refer to an ego or any ro-
bust notion of a self. Moreover, the kind of awareness I’m suggesting
is not a categorical awareness, i.e., an awareness of the experiential
moment as belonging to a category of consciousness (see  Metzinger
2009). Rather, it is meant simply to point to a reflexivity of aware-
ness  (see  the  concept  of  “pre-reflective  self-awareness”  in  Zahavi
2005).
10 Thanks to Thomas Metzinger for pointing out this issue. 
Kühle, L. (2015). Insight: What Is It, Exactly? - A Commentary on Ursula Voss & Allan Hobson.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 38(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570696 5 | 13
www.open-mind.net
would rely on theory-contaminated beliefs—cer-
tain conceptions of what a dream is like, etc. Per-
haps there is no way of avoiding theory-contamin-
ation altogether, and thus the issue becomes one
of determining how much contamination is allow-
able in the case of insight.
I certainly grant that given the state of re-
search into lucid dreaming—it is still very much
in its infancy, no doubt—it is not unexpected
that a clear understanding of a complex concept
such as “insight” is still lacking. To be sure, the
authors have provided a good starting point for
developing a full description of the state of in-
sight.  However,  given that it  is,  arguably, the
key element of  dream lucidity,  I  worry about
how well we can empirically investigate, or in-
terpret our empirical findings of the whys and
hows of lucid dreaming if we don’t first ensure
that  we  have  a  working  understanding  of  in-
sight. To define insight as a form of meta-aware-
ness,  or  secondary consciousness  that  involves
actively acquired self-knowledge, is not inform-
ative enough to allow us an understanding of
what insight in dream consciousness is or why it
is so special and important. 
To be sure, I think it would be entirely in-
appropriate to hold Voss and Hobson accountable
for not teasing out the concept of insight further.
They are empirical researchers, and as such have
paved the way for future research in this area.
However, I think that the lack of conceptual clar-
ity and the semantic vagueness that remains in
this area point to the need for philosophical in-
quiry and the value of integrating philosophical
work with empirical work on lucid dreaming. It
now lies in the hands of philosophers to ensure
that the future progress of this research is based
on a strong conceptual foundation. One direction
to take in this  endeavor is  to follow Voss and
Hobson’s suggestion and look at other areas of re-
search concerned with meta-awareness, reflection,
and insight. In the next section, I propose that
one such area is that of meditation. 
4 Lucidity, meta-awareness, and 
meditation
The second point I want to focus on is Voss and
Hobson’s desire to consider other states of con-
sciousness to better understand the state of lu-
cid dreaming. In particular, they express an in-
terest in considering altered states such as hyp-
nosis or mind wandering. I suggest that there
might also be benefit in considering meditation.
Specifically, I think we can fruitfully make use
of how the notion of insight in meditative ex-
periences is developed to clarify that of insight
in lucid dreaming. We would first have to show
that  there  are  enough  important  similarities
between the notion of insight involved in medit-
ation and the notion of insight involved in lucid
dreaming, and this will be my aim in what fol-
lows.
To be sure,  there  are  many and various
meditation  styles  and practices,  each  with  its
own experiential path to higher states of aware-
ness. Broadly speaking, there are three categor-
ies  of  meditative practice,  each with variants,
and there is overlap in some respects between
the categories.11 First, there is focused attention
meditation—this involves developing one’s abil-
ity to concentrate on an object for an unlimited
amount of time. Second, there is open presence
meditation—this involves opening one’s aware-
ness to all experiential aspects of the moment,
e.g.,  mental states,  bodily sensations, environ-
mental stimuli, etc., and not attending to any-
thing in particular. Third, there is insight med-
itation—this involves developing mindfulness or
meta-awareness over one’s mental states. More
specifically,  and most interestingly when com-
pared to the concept of insight in lucid dream-
ing, “[insight meditation] is also one of the earli-
est and most fundamental forms of meditation.
For Buddhist theorists, [insight meditation] is a
style  of  meditation  that,  in  combination with
the  focus  or  stability  provided  by  cultivating
[focused attention], enables the practitioner to
gain insight into one’s habits and assumptions
about identity and emotions” (Lutz et al. 2007,
p. 504).  For my purposes here,  I  will  set  the
finer variations among these three main styles
of meditation aside since I’m merely concerned
with  drawing  out  the  similarities,  in  broad
strokes,  between  the  sought-after  meditative
state and the insight it is intended to provide,
11 See  Lutz et al. (2007) for a more detailed account of the various
styles of meditative practice and their historical roots. 
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and the lucid dreaming state and the insight re-
quired to bring it about. Interestingly, however,
the concept of insight applied to the practice of
insight meditation is quite similar in many re-
spects to the concept of insight applied to the
experience of lucid dreaming. 
To be sure,  the concept of insight,  as it
relates to meditation, is very complex, and also
not fully defined. There are many levels of in-
sight, and many aspects of mental life, the self,
and life more broadly that one achieves insight
about, depending on the style of meditation one
engages in and the level of mastery one develops
in one’s meditative practice. For example, in the
practice  of  focused  attention  meditation,  a
novice practitioner might be said to have gained
insight  upon becoming aware of  the difficulty
involved in maintaining attention on the flow of
the  breath  through  the  nostrils.  The  insight
here  is  of  a  particular  aspect  of  mental  life,
namely,  the  fleeting  nature  of  attention.
Whereas in the case of an experienced practi-
tioner with hours of meditative experience, the
insight gained may involve the nature of the self
—for example, that it is characterized by desire
and craving, or that it is ultimately an illusion.
Nevertheless,  I  think  that  we  can  certainly
make use of the way the concept of insight is
broadly understood in meditation to clarify its
relation to lucid dreaming, if it has any relation.
First, I take it that when we speak of in-
sight gained through meditation, we aren’t re-
ferring  to  a  particular  state  that  is  achieved,
but rather to a form of knowledge that is gained
within a state of consciousness. The state from
within which we might be said to achieve in-
sight is a state of meta-awareness, but being in
this state doesn’t necessarily imply that insight
has  been  achieved.  For  example,  the  novice
practitioner may become meta-aware of what it
is like to try to maintain focused attention on
the  breath,  but  this  doesn’t  necessarily  mean
that  he  gains  knowledge  from this  about  the
nature  of  attention  and  consciousness  more
broadly. Conversely, it seems that in the case of
lucid dreaming,  at  least as  described by Voss
and Hobson, insight is  understood to be syn-
onymous  with  meta-awareness.  This  seems  a
natural understanding given that, as per Voss
and Hobson, when lucidity is achieved there is
necessarily insight. That is, one could not, it ap-
pears, be meta-aware of their dreaming without
having  insight  into  the  fact  that  they  are
dreaming. However, is this really  insight? This
is where I think we may want to tease apart the
notions of lucidity and insight, following our un-
derstanding  of  meta-awareness  and  insight  in
cases of meditation. 
In the case of lucid dreaming, there cer-
tainly is the experience of coming to realize one
is in a dream state. This is the phenomenolo-
gical interpretation of the state of insight I dis-
cussed  in  the  previous  section—what  I  also
called the self-awareness of dreaming. However,
we may want to refer  to  this  aspect  of  lucid
dreaming  as  lucidity,  rather  than  insight.  In
other words, when lucidity occurs while dream-
ing, why should we not be satisfied saying that
one has simply become aware of their dream-
ing? Why should we take this to be insightful?
Maybe because lucidity doesn’t merely involve a
passive awareness of the dream state, but also
an understanding by the dreamer of  what she
has become aware of—and this enables dissoci-
ation,  plot  control,  etc.  The  suggestion  that
there is now an understanding that the dreamer
has of being in a dream, however, brings into
the  picture  the  epistemological  interpretation
mentioned earlier. Given this, insight is better
viewed  as  an  epistemic  state.  In  fact,  maybe
there is not only a need to dissociate lucidity
from insight in the case of lucid dreaming; we
may  want  to  grant  that  both  admit  to  phe-
nomenological and epistemological degrees.12 As
we see in meditation, there are many levels of
insight—many areas of our existence of which
we can gain knowledge—and so maybe there is
also reason to think that there are further forms
of insight to be had in lucid dreaming as well.
One  particularly  interesting  point  of  conver-
gence  between  the  empirical  work  on  lucid
dreaming and meditation is in the phenomenon
of dream yoga.13 As a result, we might not want
12 This very idea has been explored in  Windt & Metzinger (2007), as
well as in Noreika et al. (2010). 
13 In particular,  the  case  of  Tibetan dream yoga mentioned  earlier,
which involves using meditative practice in the dream, might be an
instance of exploring just how meditation and lucid dreaming can
come together, and could be informative for our understanding of
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to define insight as a state of consciousness, or
as a  meta-awareness.  Rather,  we may instead
see insight as a form of knowledge that accom-
panies lucidity, and lucidity as a form of meta-
awareness.
Another area of similarity between medita-
tion and lucid dreaming that I want to explore
lies  in  the  structure  of  each  of  these  experi-
ences.14 Both seem to involve some form of dis-
sociation.  As  Voss &  Hobson (this  collection)
describe, “lucid dreams can be considered disso-
ciated  states  of  consciousness  in  which  the
dream Self separates from the ongoing flow of
mental imagery. The dream is still a dream but
the person is able to distance him/herself from
the ongoing imagery and may even be successful
in  gaining  (at  least  partial)  control  over  the
dream plot” (pp. 8–9). The experiential feature
of  separation  of  the dreamer  from the  dream
while the dream continues to unfold is akin to
the observational stance that one strives to take
in meditation, in particular in focused medita-
tion.  When  meditating,  one  aims  to  become
aware  of  one’s  stream  of  consciousness—one
tries to separate oneself,  as it  were,  from the
stream of thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc., in or-
der to become aware of its transient nature. For
example, one becomes aware of, say, the fleeting
nature of attention and mental life. Similarly in
lucid dreaming, one becomes aware of being in a
dreaming state. 
However, the concept of “self” that seems
to underlie Voss and Hobson’s discussion of lu-
cid dreaming is quite different from how the self
is understood in meditation. Voss and Hobson
appear to have a very robust sense of  self  at
play, and I’m not quite sure why this is so, or
whether we want to bring such a conception of
self  into the  picture.  One of  the  most  telling
passages  in  their  article,  and one  that  I  find
most problematic is the following:
both the nature of meditative states and that of lucid dreams. As
LaBerge notes, “for more than a thousand years Tibetan Buddhists
have believed that it is possible to maintain the functional equival-
ence  of  full  waking  consciousness  during  sleep.  This  belief  is  not
based  on  anything  as  tenuous  as  theoretical  grounds  but  upon
firsthand experience with a sophisticated set of lucid dreaming tech-
niques collectively known as the Doctrine of Dreams or dream yoga”
(2003, p. 233). 
14 See Evan Thompson’s entry in this collection, as well as Thompson
(2014).
This fits well with the common description
of lucid dreams as (partial) awakening in
your  dreams  and  of  involving  a  split
between dreamer and dream observer who
coexist and change relative dominance of
the mind at will (Occhionero et al. 2005).
The implications of this line of reasoning
have  profound  impact  on  the  theory  of
mind. There are two selves suggesting that
the self  is  a construct elaborated by the
brain (Metzinger, 2003, 2009, 2013a). The
two selves of the lucid dreamer […] (Voss &
Hobson this collection, p. 9, emphasis ad-
ded).
Why would we want to describe the result of
the dissociation in lucid dreaming as one that
involves a split between a dreamer self  and a
dream-observer self? Furthermore, on the basis
of what would there be reason to argue that the
self is a construct?
If the experience in lucid dreaming is one
of shifting back and forth between being meta-
aware of being in dream consciousness and be-
ing  in  the  dream  itself  as  the  dreamer,  why
would we not want to speak of this as a change
in experiential perspective rather than as an ex-
perience of two selves?15 Moreover, if we look to
how  similar  meditative  experiences  are  de-
scribed,  we  don’t  speak  of  there  being  two
selves, the self within the stream of conscious-
ness  and the self  that observes the stream of
consciousness. Rather, we speak of our shifting
experiential perspectives wherein we move, as a
single subject of experience, from being within
the flow of consciousness to observing the flow
of  consciousness.  Furthermore,  one  of  the  in-
sights  gained from meditative practice is  that
there is indeed no self. 
I grant that it is perhaps in keeping with
the  subjective  reports  of  lucid  dreamers  to
speak of two selves in the lucid dream state. If
the subjective report that Voss & Hobson quote
in their paper (this collection, p. 9) is but one
example of the way in which subjects describe
their experiences,  then it certainly seems nat-
15 The shift in experiential perspective might even be more complex
than this; see Rosen & Sutton (2013) for an interesting discussion of
self-representation in dreams.
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ural to take on such a view of the self. However,
I  suspect  that  the  subjective  reports  may be
constructed in a manner that is biased by a cer-
tain  colloquial  manner  of  speaking  about  the
self,16 and thus don’t rightly capture if and what
the self  is in relation to the structure of con-
sciousness. Certainly I am not suggesting that
we  shouldn’t  take  the  subjective  reports  seri-
ously—indeed I think that they provide invalu-
able information into the phenomenology of lu-
cid dreaming. However, we must be careful to
properly  interpret  these  reports,  and  perhaps
this  will  involve  developing  ways  to  discover
whether certain biases have come into play in
the subject’s report of her experience, and how
these biases have affected the qualitative data. 
5 The hybrid state hypothesis and bodily
awareness
The third and last point I want to consider is
the place of the body, and bodily awareness, in
lucid dreaming. I was particularly struck by two
lucid dreamer reports. The first is the one that
Voss & Hobson quote in their paper wherein the
lucid  dreamer  explains  that  “[i]n  these  short
periods of lucidity the awareness of the acting
dream body and the real body in bed exist sim-
ultaneously and it costs a lot of concentration
to keep the balance between both” (this collec-
tion, p. 9). The second comes from Dutch psy-
chiatrist  Frederik  van  Eeden,  who  coined  the
phrase “lucid dreaming”: 
In January, 1898 […] I was able to repeat
the observation. […] I  dreamt that I was
lying in the garden before the windows of
my  study,  and  saw  the  eyes  of  my dog
through the glass pane. I was lying on my
chest and observing the dog very keenly.
At the same time, however, I knew with
perfect certainty that I was dreaming and
lying on my back in my bed. And then I
resolved to wake up slowly and carefully
and observe how my sensation of lying on
my chest would change to the sensation of
lying on my back. And so I did, slowly and
16 This, as Metzinger would point out, would be another instance of
theory contamination. 
deliberately,  and  the  transition—which  I
have since undergone many times—is most
wonderful. It is like the feeling of slipping
from one body into another, and there is
distinctly a double recollection of the two
bodies.  I  remembered what  I  felt  in  my
dream, lying on my chest;  but returning
into the day-life, I remembered also that
my physical body had been quietly lying
on its back all the while. This observation
of  a  double  memory  I  have  had  many
times  since.  It  is  so  indubitable  that  it
leads  almost  unavoidably  to  the  concep-
tion of a dream-body. (van Eeden 1913)17
I found the description of there being two bod-
ies  rather  interesting,  and,  particularly  in  the
subject report cited by Voss and Hobson, the
mention of the cost of concentration to be very
intriguing. To be sure, there is but one physical
body,  namely  the  one  lying  in  bed.  Yet  the
dreamer experiences both the body in bed and
the  body  with  which  she  is  engaged  in  the
dream,  and  finds  it  somewhat  demanding  to
maintain an experiential balance between both.
In this last section, I put forward an explana-
tion of this experience by relying on the Hybrid
State Hypothesis alongside my work on bodily
awareness during waking consciousness. 
According to the HSH Voss and Hobson
put forward,  lucid dreaming is  a hybrid state
with both elements of waking and dream con-
sciousness. This is so because there is a dissoci-
ation that occurs between the dream self  and
the ongoing dream imagery. Physiologically, al-
though  brain  activity  associated  with  REM
sleep continues, in lucid dreaming there arises,
in addition, brain activity in parts of the brain
associated with conscious awareness and execut-
ive ego functions. The hypothesis, then, is that
“lucid dreams push the arousal system towards
waking yet  remaining within the  region occu-
pied by REM sleep […]. Lucid dreaming is, thus,
a  fragile,  destabilized  hybrid  state”  (Voss &
Hobson this collection, p. 9). If this hypothesis
is correct, then there may be value in looking at
how we are aware of our body in a waking con-
17 Thanks to Metzinger for pointing out this classical description of a
lucid dream experience. 
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scious state to help better understand the seem-
ing duality of bodily awareness involved in lucid
dreams.  More specifically,  if  we take seriously
the above-quoted subjective report, then the hy-
brid state hypothesis in combination with cer-
tain hypotheses about bodily awareness in wak-
ing conscious states might shed light on how the
experience arises. 
What I find particularly interesting about
the reports are two things: 
a. the simultaneous experience of a dream
body and the real body in bed; and
b. the amount of concentration needed to
keep the balance between both.
In regards to the first, I find myself wondering
the following: what does the subject mean by
simultaneous, here? Does she mean that both
bodies  are  experienced  at  the  same  time,  or
rather, that there is a very quick and continu-
ous shift back and forth from the dream body
to the real body, such that it  seems like they
are  both  being  experienced  simultaneously?  I
am inclined to think that what is happening is
a  very  quick  attentional  shift  back and  forth
between the two “bodies”. My reasons for think-
ing this come from how I account for our bodily
awareness in waking life.
I take it that in our everyday experiential
lives we are aware of our body both as an ob-
ject and as a subject. The distinction between
awareness of the body as object and as subject
stems  from  the  Phenomenological  tradition18
and it is best understood as follows. I can be
said to be aware of my body as object when I
direct  my attention  to  my body and  thereby
perceive it as I would any other object in the
world. The key characteristic of our awareness
of the body as object is that it is attentional.
Alternatively, I can be said to be aware of my
body as subject when I am aware of my body as
that through which I experience the world—not
as an object onto which I turn my attention,
but rather as that which engages with my envir-
onment. My awareness of my body as subject is
18 A philosophical  tradition most  often associated with the  work of
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, etc. 
also referred to as a bodily self-awareness, and
it is characterized by an inattentional awareness
—a  form of  awareness  that  does  not  involve
holding attention to an object.19
Now, my typical experiential consciousness
involves  a  bodily  self-awareness,  although  it
doesn’t always involve an awareness of the body
as object. This is because I don’t always attend
to my body. Take, for example, my sitting in a
chair  reading a book.  Typically,  my attention
lies with the book—I focus on the words on the
page, say. In attending to the book, I don’t sim-
ultaneously  attend  to  my  hands  holding  the
book, although they are certainly a part of my
overall  experience insofar as they don’t disap-
pear from my awareness entirely. I certainly can
shift my attention to my hands, and thereby be-
come aware of them as object; however, in doing
so, I contend, I am no longer attentively aware
of the words I was reading a moment ago. In
fact, I take it that if I were to try to be aware
of my hands and the words on the page simul-
taneously, I would find this quite difficult as it
would involve a continuous and rapid shift in
attention back and forth between the words and
my hands. I think a similar account holds in the
case of lucid dreaming with regard to the dream
body and the real body. 
I propose that in the case of one’s bodily
awareness in lucid dreaming, the real body is
experienced both as subject and as object. It is
the  subject’s  actual  body,  and  therefore  one
that she is aware of as subject, but in addition
her  experience  of  her  real  body,  in  the  lucid
dream,  is  of  her  body  as  an  object—she  be-
comes aware of her body as object by her atten-
tion shifting to it momentarily. However, her at-
tention does not remain with her real body; in-
stead it quickly shifts back to the dream body
as well. In that experiential moment, the dream
body becomes an object for her as she attends
to  it.  I  think  the  further  clue  as  to  why we
should interpret the experience of the body in
lucid dreams as one of shifting attention, and
even perhaps competing attention between the
real  and  the  dream  body,  comes  from  the
second  element  of  the  subject’s  report  men-
19 I develop this distinction further in my thesis,  “Embodiment and
Subjectivity—the Origins of Bodily Self-Awareness”.
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tioned above—the claim that “it costs a lot of
concentration  to  keep  the  balance  between
both”.
Why is  there  a  need  to  keep  a  balance
between the real and the dream body? Perhaps
because,  as  the  HSH suggests,  there  are  ele-
ments of both waking and dreaming states at
play. If we take bodily awareness to be a funda-
mental  element  of  waking  consciousness—or
even consciousness tout court, as I do—as well
as a key element of dream consciousness, then it
makes perfect sense that in a lucid dream the
subject finds herself with these two bodies that
must  be  balanced  in  the  same  way  that  the
waking and the dream states must be balanced
to remain in the lucid dreaming state.20 
The question then becomes: why does it
cost a lot of concentration to maintain this bal-
ance? I think the answer to this question brings
us right back to my suggestion above, namely
that  the  simultaneity  of  the  dream  and  real
body experience is one of shifting, or even com-
peting attention. If there is a continuous shift in
attention, rather than a joint experience of both
bodies,  then  this  would  explain  the  apparent
cost  of  trying  to  maintain  concentration  on
both bodies in a lucid dream state. It would be
like walking a tightrope, trying to avoid leaning
too far to the right or too far to the left, and
doing so by continuously shifting your body to
maintain that balance. It would require an in-
credible amount of concentration—in a general
sense,  one  experiences  everything  all  at  once,
but in a more precise sense, one’s attention is
continuously  shifting  between  one’s  body  and
one’s  environment  in  order  to  maintain  bal-
ance.21 
One last point of inquiry. As I mentioned
above, there is a distinction to be made in ac-
counting for our bodily awareness in waking ex-
periential consciousness between our awareness
of the body as object and our awareness of the
body  as  subject,  i.e.,  bodily  self-awareness.
20 The place and role of the body, and our bodily awareness in lucid
dream states, is  far more complex than I can show here—in fact,
there are instances of bodiless dreams. Although a complete consid-
eration of these issues is beyond the scope of this commentary, an
excellent discussion of this topic can be found in Windt (2010).
21 This is also how lucid dreams are commonly described in the literat-
ure, i.e., as a balancing act. See LaBerge (1985) and Brooks & Vogel-
song (2000). 
However, I wonder if a similar distinction might
also apply in cases of lucid dreaming given the
HSH.  In  other  words,  is  there  a  bodily  self-
awareness—of the real body or even the dream
body in a lucid dreaming state? And, if so, how
does  it  relate  to  the  awareness  of  the  dream
body and the real body described by subjective
reports? To begin answering these questions we
would need to explore the subjective reports of
lucid  dream  experience  in  relation  to  bodily
awareness more specifically. Perhaps we might
begin by looking back upon the report by van
Eden. Indeed, I certainly take this to be an in-
teresting avenue of exploration given the ever-
increasing interest  in  taking  an embodied ap-
proach to consciousness. 
6 Conclusion
In closing, let me review the three points of
inquiry on which I chose to focus here. First, I
inquired as to what exactly the concept of in-
sight  involves  in  the  case  of  lucid  dreaming
and whether we should think of insight as a
phenomenal  or  epistemic  state.  I  suggested
that  the  lack  of  clarity  with  regard  to  the
concept of insight shows the need for rigorous
philosophical  inquiry  with  a  view  to  laying
down  a  solid  conceptual  foundation  from
which  to  pursue  future  empirical  research.
Second, I inquired as to how meditation and
lucid dreaming are similar and where research
on  meditation  might  provide  information  to
research on lucid dreaming. I highlighted some
interesting overlaps in the concepts of insight
in  meditative  practice  and  lucid  dreaming,
and explored the feature of dissociation in lu-
cid  dreaming  in  relation  to  the  notion  of  a
self.  Third, I looked at how we are aware of
our  body  in  lucid  dreaming  and  considered
whether  our accounts of  bodily awareness  in
waking  consciousness  can  be  used  to  inform
our understanding of bodily awareness in lucid
dreaming. I also suggested that the distinction
between awareness of the body as object and
of the body as subject used to describe waking
bodily awareness could help us tease out the
ways in which the body is experienced in lucid
dreams.
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As I stated above, the empirical study of
lucid dreaming is still very new and, thus, still
very much in an exploratory phase. As a result,
it is easy to point out various areas for further
inquiry and suggest avenues of future investiga-
tion. However, it is nonetheless important to ac-
knowledge the work that Voss and Hobson have
done to advance our understanding of the phe-
nomenon of lucid dreaming. Not only have they
provided  a  convincing  account  of  why  lucid
dreaming occurs (BMH), they also put forward
an interesting hypothesis for the neural basis of
lucid  dreaming  (GBH).  Moreover,  their  HSH
and SCH will  serve to further the conceptual
analysis  of  lucid dreaming and its  relation to
other  mental  states  across  the  spectrum  of
sleeping  to  waking  consciousness.  In  short,  I
agree  with  Voss &  Hobson that  “the  experi-
mental  study of  lucid dreaming is  a  powerful
paradigm for understanding the brain basis of
conscious  experience”  (this  collection,  p.  4).
Moving forward, we must now expand the area
of research to allow for important philosophical
considerations that will strengthen the concep-
tual  framework  underlying  this  exciting  new
paradigm.
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